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Change and Continuity in the Recruitment
of Italian Political Terrorists: 1970-1984
LEONARD W EINB ERG AND WILLIAM

L EE EUBANK

University of Nevada-Reno
(This is a revision of a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
American Political Science Association,
New Orleans, August
29-September 1, 1985)

Understanding the growth of political terrorism has become a central
concern expressed in the professional literature. Various techniques have
been used to measure the spread of terrorist events both within and between
nations. 1 As part of this endeavor analysts have drawn parallels between the
spread of contagious diseases and outbreaks of terrorist activities. And
naturally enough, given the way in which the situation has been defined,
these analysts have sought to prescribe the most appropriate therapies with
which to reduce or eliminate the infection.
In view of the way in which the problem has been approached, it is
somewhat surprising that more attention has not been focused on the
bearers of the contagion: the terrorists themselves. This is not to say that
observers of political terrorism have ignored the perpetrators: far from it.
The literature abounds with excellent studies of the social and psychological
characteristics of these individuals. 2 But these investigations, intended to
produce a 'terrorist profile,• seem not to take into account the possibility
that different sorts of people might be attracted to terrorism at different
stages in the spread of the phenomenon. Do people from the same or similar
backgrounds become involved in terrorist operations over the entire lifespan of a terrorist organization? Or, does the susceptibility vary among individuals the longer the outbreak is sustained?
Given the enormous attention terrorist activities receive in the mass
media, it seems reasonable to believe that individuals who join or form terrorist groups after a terrorist episode has begun would confront a different
situation than those who were responsible for its initiation. At a minimum,
the circumstances would be altered by virtue of the fact that the latecomers
would be aware of the various costs, risks and opportunities surrounding
the decision to become the member of a terrorist band. But do changes in
circumstances mean changes in the kinds of people who become terrorists?
Of course, in any number of countries this question is rendered moot
because the authorities succeed in isolating and repressing the terrorist
organizations before they can recruit new members from outside the ranks
of their founders .
This has not been the case in Italy however. Among the industrialized
democracies, Italy has experienced one of the most protracted national
episodes of political terrorism. The episode is widely regarded as having
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begun with the bombing of the National Agricultural Bank of Piazza Fontana in Milan in December 1969 and not to have ended, or even subsided,
until the wave of arrests that followed the release of American General
James Dozier from his Red Brigades' kidnappers in 1982. At a reduced level
of intensity, the terrorism continues to the present.
In addition to its duration there are several other features of the Italian
terrorist experience that are important to call to the reader's attention. 3
First, as distinguished from the long-lived experiences of Northern Ireland
and the Basque country of Spain, causes of a nationalist-separatist nature
were not significant stimuli for the outbeak of terrorism. Instead, the
sources in the Italian case appear to have been predominantly ideological,
sources not rooted in the long-standing grievances of a particular ethnic or
religious community; that is, groups whose members often may serve as
constant pools from which terrorist bands may recruit new adherents. Second, the ideologies that motivated Italian terrorists were not exclusively of
leftist origin. In addition to groups animated by revolutionary communist
objectives, variously defined, a substantial amount of the violence was the
work of formations that derived their inspiration from Fascist or neoFascist doctrines .
Another characteristic of the Italian experience concerns the timing of
the violence. There was an initial wave of terrorism beginning in 1969 and
extending to 1976. By the middle of that year most members of the Red
Brigades' 'historic nucleus' as well as most members of the Armed Proletarian Nuclei and Partisan Action Groups, the other major leftist groups,
had been arrested. Furthermore, the initial wave of violent neo-Fascist
organizations, the New Order, National Vanguard, the National Front and
others, had been dissolved by the authorities and many of their leaders,
militants and sponsors had met the same fate as their leftist counterparts. In
fact, it appeared as if the terrorist episode had come to an end. But this was
not to be. Nineteen seventy-seven witnessed the reignition of terrorist
violence. New groups on both the Left and Right arose to take the place of
the old; in turn, these bands succeeded in recruiting large numbers of new
adherents. Further, old groups, notably the Red Brigades, managed to attract a largely new generation(s) of members. What then followed in the
next several years was a dramatic escalation in the numbers of terrorist
events throughout the country. The style of the violence was also somewhat
different. Previously the leftist groups had carried out "exemplary actions"
intended to bring their cause to the attention of the working class. In the
new phase they began to wage revolutionary "campaigns"
against the
bourgeois system and to direct their efforts against "the heart of the state."
The neo-Fascist groups also changed tactics and exhibited a willingness to
attack selected representatives of government authority. Finally, the second
spasm of terrorism differed from the initial one by virtue of the political
coloration of those groups responsible for committing the bulk of it.•
Measured in terms of direction, the first wave of violence was
dominated by the neo-Fascists. It was they who were responsible for the majority of violent events, including the massacres at Piazza Fontana as well as
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those in Brescia and on the express train Italicus both in 1974. The Red
Brigades, on the other hand, did not kill their first victim until 1974. Despite
the formation of new neo-Fascist groups (e.g., Third Position, Nuclei of
Armed Revolutionaries) after the mid 1970's, it was the revolutionary communist ones that dominated terrorist activities from 1977. There was, in
short, a shift from Black to Red.
II
Bearing in mind the above account, the question we intend to address is
this: In what ways, if any, did individuals who became involved in terrorist
activities before 1977 differ from those whose careers in terrorism began in
or followed that year? To answer this question biographical information
was obtained concerning 2,512 individuals who were either arrested or for
whom warrants were issued for having committed, planned or supported
acts of political terrorism between 1970 and the first half of 1984. This information was derived from two national circulation newspapers, La Stampa of Turin and La Repubblica of Rome, as well as court records (requisitorie, ordinanzelsentenze and sentenze) from many though not all of
the major terrorist trials.' The data file taken from these sources does not
represent a sample, it is instead a reasonably extensive collection of the
Italian terrorist population. The information collected about the terrorists
included their gender, communities and regions of birth as well as those of
adult residence. Aside from these characteristics, information was also
recorded concerning their occupational backgrounds, family relationships
and pre-terrorist political involvements. Finally, we noted in what year they
were arrested/identified as terrorists, their ages at that time (and for reasons
to be made clear later, their ages in 1969), the particular terrorist organization with which they were affiliated and the roles they played inside the
groups.
However, the investigators cannot be certain but that either they or
their sources failed to locate other individuals whose behavior would warrant inclusion. Further, the possibility exists that a number of individuals
whose records appear in the file were, in fact, innocent of the crimes they
were alleged to have committed . Last on our list of qualifications is the fact
that the careers of some terrorists overlapped the two periods into which we
have divided the episode. Some individuals may have begun their involvements before 1977 but only came to the attention of the authorities
during or after that year. In most cases, it was possible to correct for this
problem based on the person's terrorist group affiliation. That is, if the person was identified as a member of a group like the New Order of the Nuclei
of Armed Proletarians, organizations whose operations were largely confined to the first period, the individual was presumed to have begun his/her
involvement at that time and assigned a position accordingly. Inevitably
though some individuals escaped this procedure. But given the size of the
data file, their impact on the overall analysis is not likely to be a very large
one.
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III
For some observers, Italian terrorism is best understood as a byproduct of the "culture of 1968." 6 In 1968 and the "hot autumn" of 1969,
Italy experienced a massive explosion of student protest and worker militancy. The events of these years have been defined as an institutional crisis,
with existing political, educational and trade union organizations proving
unable to contain or channel the rapid mobilization of so many angry
citizens. Radical extraparliamentary movements were organized by and for
those students, workers and alienated individuals from various walks of life
who found existing institutions to have fallen victim to something approaching the iron law oJ oligarchy. The events of 1968-69 have also been
interpreted as a generational rebellion. The young, of neo-Fascist as well as
leftist disposition, withdrew their support from or de-authorized a whole array of institutions they perceived as having become dominated by gerontocratic leaderships.
This institutional crisis or generational rebellion had profound consequences on the development of political terrorism. One interpretation has it
that some individuals, those who organized the Red Brigades' for example,
initiated terrorist activities after brief transitional exposures to the extraparliamentary movements. For other future leftist terrorists the impact of
1968-69 was delayed. After years of membership in extraparliamentary
movements like Worker Power and Continuous Struggle, these individuals
turned to terrorism after the collapse of the New Left in the 1976 national
elections, elections which also resulted in a failure to remove the hated
Christian Democratics from control of the national government. As the
radicals saw it, years of struggle by the movements had come to nothing.
The only way to unblock the Italian political system and achieve their
revolutionary objectives was through use of political violence. The Communist party, a likely alternative, was unable to integrate the revolutionaries; in 1976 it was pursuing an historic compromise with the Christian
Democrats, a policy of reformism and working class betrayal from their
perspective.
This commentary suggests an understanding of the terrorist
phenomenon through what amounts to a "big bang" theory. The events of
1968-69 were a formative experience for a generation of young Italians. The
effects, immediate for some long-term for others, were to provide an impetus for involvement in terrorism. To become a terrorist one had to be
touched directly by the events of 1968-69.
Although this was no doubt true for some, in general the data do not
support this interpretation (see Table 1). Of the 2,512 individuals in our terrorist population, 46 per cent were under the age of 16 in 1969, and 18 per
cent were less than 11 years old when the upheaval occurred. In other
words, these were people too young to have taken a direct part in the turbulent events of these years.
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TA BLE I
Age Distribution of Italian Terrorists in 1969

(Per Cent)

Number of Terrorists

Age

( I)
(17)
(29)
(22)

17
417
732

I 10 5
610 10
11 10 15
1610 20
21 lO 25
26 10 30
31 10 35
36 10 40
41 lO 45
46 10 50
SI and above
N

556
295
131
56
42
31
16
219

( I)
( 9)

= 2,5 12

( 100)

(12)

( 5)
( 2)
( 2)
( I)

Even if we confine the analysis to left-wing terrorists, the segment of
the population really intended to be covered by this interpretation, the outcome is not altered. In fact, the left-wing terrorists were actually younger in
J969 than were the neo-Fascists. Of the 1,763 leftists in the study, 853 (or 64
per cent) were under 16. Furthermore, if 1968-69 was crucial in the making
of terrori sts, we would expect that over time their ages would increase as
they were apprehended or identified by the authorities . Yet this is not true
either. The terrorists identified in 1977 and after were significantly younger
than those whose involvements were reported during the first period.
If participation in the events of 1968-69 was not an indispensable ingredient in the decision to embark on a career as a terrorist, it would seem likely that some process of cultural or ideological transmission was at work. If
it was not the same individuals sharing the same experiences, then perhaps
the post 1976 terrorists became susceptible to the contagion as the result of
expo sure to the same social climate and institutional setting as gave rise to
the first wave.
We sought to deal with this issue by dividing our population into those
individuals who were identified as terrorists before 1977 and those who
received the designation in 1977 and after. The differences between the two
groups are summarized in Table 2.

TAB LE 2
Differences Between Early (1970-1976) and
Late ( 1977- 1984) Italian Terror ists
Characteristic

2A:

Late

X'

= 32.86

prob . :s .001

Sex

Male

Female

449
(23.8) '

50
(11.2)

1441
(76.2)

395
(88.8)

1890

445

phi = .12

• Percentages in parenthesis arc colu mn percents.
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1836

28 :

Birthpla ce
(region)

Foreign
Early

156
(31.0)

Center
50
(34.0)

Late

348
(69.0)

97
(66.0)

184
(83.3)

252
(81.3)

37
(88. 1)

918

147

221

310

42

1224

North

504
X' = 34.31

prob .

s .001

tau b

Rome

South

Born

37
(16.7)

58
(18.7)

5
(11.9)

306

= . 13
2C: Birthplace
(size of community)

Foreign
Small

Medium

Big City

Born

Early

86
(19.5)

109
(28.2)

119
(24.0)

5
( 11.9)

319

La1e

354
(80.5)

277
(71.8)

377
(76.0)

37
(88.1)

1054

386

496

42

1364

440
X' = 11.88

prob .

s .001

tau b = -.02
2D:

Place of Residen ce
(region)

Foreign
Early

North

Center

Rome

South

Born

273
(22.6)•

60
(26. 1)

80
(14.0)

57
(22.5)

(33.3)

935
(77.4)

170
(73.9)

492
(86.0)

196
(77.5)

2
(66.7)

230

S72

253

Late

1208

X' = 23. 15

prob .

s .001

I

471
l79S
2266

tau b = .047
2E : Place of Residence
(size of community)

Early

Late

Small

Medium

52
(21.7)

136
(26. 1)

Bis City
285
(18.9)

188
(78.3)

386
(73.9)

1226
(81.1)

522

1226

240
X' = 12.57

prob .

s .006

Foreign
Bom
474

I

(33.3)
2
(66.7)

1802
2276

tau b = .058

Family Relationship to Other Terrorists
No
51
443
(16.7)
(21.9)

2F :

Yes

Early

Late

X' = 3.91

prob.

s .04

phi

=

494

254
(83.3)

1582
(78. 1)

1836

305

2025

2330

.043
20 : Type of Family Relationship

Early
Late

Marital

Sibling
26
(18.7)

Parental
5
(41.7)

Other

16
(11.8) '
120
(88.2)

113
(81.3)

7
(S8.3)

14
(77.8)

254

139

12

18

305

136

X' = 8.54

prob .

s .036

tau b = -.132

• Percentages in parenthesis arc column percents,
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4

51

(22.2)

2H :

Prior Political Party Affiliation

Left

CcnLcr

Right

Early

30
(30 .2)

3
(75.0)

63
(73.3)

85

Lat<

44
(69.8)

I

23
(26.7)

68

(25.0)

63

4

86

153

prob . s .001

X' = 27.98

21: ExtraparliamentaryMovement Affiliation
Left

Right

Early

39
(II .4)

149
(85.6)

188

Late

302
(88.6)

25

327

(14.4)

341

174

X'

= 270 ,43

prob. :S .001

= .723

phi

2J :

Age at Time of ldentificaLion
SOand
above

20 to 24

25 to 29

30 to 34

Early

IS to 19
27
(17.6)'

ISO
(19 .7)

117
(18.S)

62
(18.7)

31
(24.8)

22
(68.8)

34
(72.3)

467

(41.4)

Late

126
(82 .4)

611
(80.3)

514
(81.S)

269

94
(7S.2)

34
(58.6)

JO
(31.3)

13
(27.7)

1671

(81.3)

631

331

125

58

32

47

2138

761

153
prob .

X' = 134.56

s

.00

35

10

39

40 10 44

45

24

49

10

tau b = -. l02

2K: Occupation
IndusFree
Prof es-

trialist

Business

House-

Worker

Ani san

Teacher

II
(17.S)

74
(21.1)

45
(12 .7)

27
(52 .9)

25
(II.SJ

27
(46.6)

14
(11.3)

38
(39 .6)

23
(65 .7)

(9.1)

52

277
(78.9)

310
(87.3)

24
(47. 1)

193

31
(53.4)

110
(88.7)

(60.4)

12
(34.3)

IO
(90.9)

l077

(88.5)

58

(82.5)
63

351

355

SI

218

58

124

96

35

II

1362

s

tau b = -.085

Late

=

Shop keeper
Salesman

letariate Studeqt
Early

X'

White
Collar
Clerk

Police
Military

Subpro -

151.97

prob .

.00

2L :

sional Manager

wife
I

285

Role in Terrorist Group

Suppcrter

Regular

Leader

Early

22
(4.7)

379
(23.5)

94
(37 .3)

495

Late

443
(95 .3)

1235
(76.5)

158
(62.7)

1836

1614

252

2331

465

X'

=

119.48

prob . :S .00

tau b

= -.218

• Percentagesin parenthesisarc column percents.
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The principal understanding to be derived from these results is that
there occurred an expansion of terrorism to wider segments of Italian society as the episode progressed. Instead of a repetitive process with the new
generation(s) of terrorists simply recapitulating the institutional and social
backgrounds of the early ones, in general, the evidence suggests that terrorist groups were able to broaden, not merely deepen, their appeal the
longer the episode continued.
Let us be more specific. While the early terrorists were overwhelmingly
male, the second wave contained a significant contingent of women. If we
examine the question of where the terrorists came from by looking at their
places of birth, compared to the first one, the second generation overrepresents people who were born in smaller communities (under 100,000) as
well as in Rome, southern Italy and abroad. Geographically it appears as if
the terrorists' roots descend from the northern and central parts of the
country to the south and out from the big cities (over l million) to smaller
towns the longer the violence persists. However, when we compare the two
groups not by their places of birth but by their places of adult residence,
some interesting changes occur. Here the second generation appears
somewhat less geographically dispersed than the first. This is true especially
of the size of the communities in which the terrorists had become resident
prior to beginning their careers in political violence. The latecomers were
more likely to have lived in the big cities of Rome, Turin, Genoa, Milan and
Naples than their predecessors. It may very well be the case then that as a
group the later terrorists were more geographically mobile, more likely to
have been newcomers to the big cities than members of the initial wave.
Whatever terrorist infection got transmitted from one generation to the next
seems to have involved a passage from longer to shorter term residents of
Italy's major metropolitan areas.
Correlatively, the occupational backgrounds of the terrorists seem to
exhibit a process of expansion. In general, though not without qualification, the pattern is one of a spread from the upper strata of Italian society to
the lower. Higher proportions of the early terrorists than the later came
from upper status positions as business managers, industrialists and the free
professions (law, medicine, architecture, journalism). The first group was
also composed disproportionately of individuals with lower middle class occupational experiences as shopkeepers, salesmen and artisans as well as
police and military officers . On the other hand, the latecomers were overrepresented among manual workers and white collar clerks, and to a lesser
extent of subproletarians (e.g., criminals, ex-convicts, prostitutes). Students
from universities and secondary schools make a relatively constant and
large contribution to the terrorists' ranks. Although the level of student involvement remains roughly the same in the two periods, the same cannot be
said for their teachers. The representation of university and secondary
school instructors increases <.ubstantially from 1977 forward.
If we treat these data somewhat differently and regard as "intellectuals" (that is people who spend a fair amount of their working time dealing
with abstract ideas) students, teachers and free professionals, the conse-
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quence is that their contribution to terrorist activities appears both high and
constant. What becomes variable between the two periods is the representation of individuals with backgrounds in business and labor. In the first
period business is over-represented while in the second labor is.
For some of the individuals in the population, the decision to become a
terrorist seems to have been a matter of family choice. Slightly over 13 per
cent of the terrorists were related to one another. This phenomenon was
more prevalent among the second wave than the first, however. In this connection, it is the incidence of the marital relationship that really changes
from the first to the second periods. Although we cannot be sure, the
greater prevalence of married couples to be found among the later
adherents to terrorist groups may have been the consequence of husbands
encouraging their wives to join, a particularly intimate form of contagion.
The two segments of our population also appear to have had somewhat
different kinds of pre-terrorist political experiences. Prior membership in a
conventional political party was more common among early than later terrorists. Conversely, the latter were more likely to have been members of the
extraparliamentary movements. The biographical records are incomplete
but we may at least speculate that over time terrorism spread from individuals who were more likely to have had experiences in conventional party political life to those whose involvements were more likely confined to
the violence supportive extraparliamentary movements or to individuals
with no reported preterrorist political experiences.
Finally, the early and late terrorists are distinguishable on the basis of
the roles they played once inside terrorist organizations. Here the
prevalence of individuals identified as "supporters," those who furnished
logistical and other forms of assistance, increased dramatically among the
late adherents. This finding may be the result of the development of a more
complex organizational structure articulated by terrorist groups after 1976
as well as an increase in their recruitment of and appeal to part-timers, individuals holding regular jobs whose commitments to the terrorist enterprise were likely less intense than persons identified as "regulars" or
"leaders" in the newspaper accounts and court records.
At this stage of the analysis the evidence points to an understanding of
Italian terrorism that emphasizes its diffusion to progressively broader
segments of the population . There appear to have been changes of various
kinds in the geographic, institutional and social settings from which the terrorists emerged. But to what extent were these changes simply an artifact of
the differential representation of leftist and neo-Fascist terrorists in the two
periods with which we are concerned? As may be seen by looking at Table 3,
a majority of pre-1977 terrorists were neo-Fascists while the great
preponderance of the later adherents were leftists. It may very well be that
the early/late distinctions we have observed were more a product of the different political composition of the two groups than they were the time
periods during which these individuals engaged in terrorist activities.
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TABL E 3

DisLri
bution of Terrorists by
Period and Political Ori en1a1ion
Righi
Lef l

N

Early

Lale

293
206
499

1557

279
1836

572
1763
2335

= 2335

In order to determine whether or not this is the case we partitioned our
population into the following four categories: early right, late right, early
left and late left. The relevant questions then became: Were the early neoFascists different from the late ones? And, were there any ways in which the
early leftists differed from their political successors?
In attempting to answer the first question let us begin with the negative
findings. First, there was no significant difference among the neo-Fascists
concerning their occupational backgrounds. In both periods they tended to
come from the same lower middle and upper middle class sectors of Italian
society. In addition, they tended to be drawn from the same right-wing
political milieu. There were few neo-Fascists in either period who drifted into terrorism after previous experiences with political parties at the center or
left or in the extraparliamentary left movements. On the other hand, there
were considerably fewer late neo-Fascists who were reported to have had
either right-wing or extraparliamentary involvements before their ties to the
terrorist groups developed. Lastly, the late neo-Fascists were no more or
less likely to have been related to one another than the first collection.
If we focus on those variables (see Table 4) that exhibit differences between early and late neo-Fascists, the case for a process of expansion
becomes far more ambiguous than it does for the general terrorist population. It is true that the later neo-Fascists were substantially younger than the
earlier group. The representation of women increases, although it is never
very high among the neo-Fascists. Also, the proportion of "supporters"
relative to "regulars" and "leaders" grows in the second wave. Yet when
we look at their places of birth and adult residence, the case for the diffusion of neo-Fascist terrorism by expansion weakens. Measured both in
terms of where they were born and resided the early neo-Fascists were a
more geographically dispersed collection of people than the later ones.
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TABLE 4
Differences Between Earl y (1970-1976) and
Late (1977-1984) co-Fascist Terrorists

Charactcristi~

Su

x'

Early 10 Late Cha n,e
late more female
9.82. I df, p s .002, phi • . 138

late younaer

x' • 91.92, 7 dr , p s .001. 'b • ·. 363
late more Rome

Pia e or Birth
(re11on)

less North and Center
x' - 108. 19, 4 dr , p s .001,, • .471
late more bi& city

Place or Birth .
(size or community)

lcs small town and
medium.sized cities
x' • 30.83, 3 dr, p s .01, ' b • .25 1
late more Rome

Place or Residence
(re11on)

less North and Center

x• • 218.76, 4 dr, p s .00 1, , • .618
late more big city
less small tow n and

Place of Residence

(size or commu nity)

medium•sizcd cily

x' • 81.53, 3 dr, p s .00 1, , • .344

late more supporters
less regularsand leaders

Role in Organization

x' • 132.20, 2 dr, p s .00 1, ' b • •.438

After the mid-1970's the neo-Fascists were a waning force. Their
leaders' plans to stimulate a coup d'etat against the Italian regime, with the
collaboration of well-wishers in the police and military establishments, had
been uncovered and defeated.' The number of terrorist events for which
they were responsible declined. In a sense our findings reflect this decline.
Geographically we witness a contraction or concentration rather than a diffusion of neo-Fascist terrorism between the two time periods. As a group
the late neo-Fascists are more urbanized and Rome-centered than the early
ones. However, when we consider the matter from a social or inter-personal
perspective, there is some evidence of spread, if not in terms of occupational background then at least as reflected by their ages, gender and level
of involvement in their respective terrorist organizations.
While neo-Fascist terrorism may have been waning in the second
period, left-wing terrorism was expanding. As measured by the number of
violent events and in the number of adherents included in our population,
terrorism from the left experienced considerable growth. Logically then we
might expect this growth to be reflected in a wider diffusion process than
was true for the neo-Fascists.
In some respects (see Table 5) the ways in which the growth of left-wing
terrorism manifested itself in the changing characteristics of the terrorists
was not very different than the early to late changes in the makeup of the
declining neo-Fascist formations. As with the latter, the second
generation(s) of leftists was younger than the first. It was also more heavily
composed of "supporters." In addition, the proportion of adherents identified as playing leadership roles in the groups declined compared to the
"regulars" and "supporters." Also, a smaller percentage of the late than
the early leftists were reported to have had prior memberships in political
parties.
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TA BLE 5
Differences Be1ween Early (I 970-76) and
Lare (1977-84) Left -Wing Tcrr orislS

Characteristic
A ge

x' =

P lace of Residence
(region)

x'

Early 10 Lare Change
late younger
218,15, 10 df, p s .001, ' b = -.218

= 15.6 1, 4 df , p

s .004, ,,

late more Center and Rome
less South
= 0.0
late more marital

Nature of Family
Rela1ionsbip

x' = 8.94, 3 df , p s .03, ' b = .058

late more workers. clerks,
teachers
less students, free professionals and
subproletarians
x' = 25.04, 8 df , p s .003, ' b = .023

Occupation

late more extraparliamcntarymovement
less political party

Previous Political
Experience

x'
Rote in Organization

x'

= 14.23,

membership

I df , p s .001, ' b

= 30.57, 2 df,

= -.251

late more supporters

p s .00 1, ' b

= -. 127

There were some ways in which the changes among leftists were unlike
those exhibited by the neo-Fascists. The occupational backgrounds of the
leftists are significantly different. Here there are noticeable declines in the
proportions of terrorists identified as free professionals and subproletarians
as well as a more modest decline in the representation of students. The proportions of manual workers, white collar clerks and teachers increases. The
effect of these changes though is hardly like that of the overall terrorist
population shown earlier. While it is true that the second period leftist
organizations were more successful in recruiting manual workers than the
first, the relatively clear pattern of terrorism spreading from high to low
status in the Italian occupational structure now becomes unclear. This pattern now seems to have been more a product of the different mixes of neoFascists and leftists found in the two periods. The neo-Fascists, early and
late, tended to come from higher status backgrounds than the leftists taken
as a whole.
When we consider the issue from a geographic perspective, we are
unable to discern any significant changes in the locations in which the leftists were born. Late leftists were no more or less likely to have been born in
the South or smaller communities, for example, than their predecessors.
There is, however, a noticeable early-to-late shift in their places of
residence, with the second generation more likely to be found in the central
regions and Rome. The representation of terrorists from the heavily industrialized northern regions remains very high over both periods. The case
for a diffusion of terrorism by expansion is attenuated by the fact that there
are proportionately fewer residents of the South among the late leftists and
there are no significant differences between the two groups related to the
size of the communities in which they were resident.
So far as the terrorists' gender is concerned, somewhat surprisingly the
late leftists did not show a statistically significant increase in female
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representation as against the early contingent. There is a shift, however, in
the kinds of women who appear during the second period. The data suggest
an increase in the proportion of married women who participated in the
left-wing groups. Furthermore, second generation women were more likely
to play leadership roles in these groups than were women who joined the
earlier formations. 8

IV
It is apparent now that some of the diffusion effects we reported earlier
in the analysis were the result of the differing mixes of neo-Fascists and leftwing revolutionaries present in the two periods of Italy's terrorist episode.
The ideologies seem to attract rather different kinds of people to terrorism.
Yet there were some differences that were sustained despite the political
distinction . If we are willing to conceive the diffusion of terrorism as the
result of (1) expansion, its spread to progressively wider segments of the
population, and (2) contagion, the spread of the infection more deeply
within the same population segments, our findings may be summarized in
the following Table 6.

TABLE 6
The Diffusion of Terrorism
age, prior political experi-

Expansion for Left Only
Occupation, place of

ence, place of residence(Rome)

residence(central regions)

Expansion for Left and Right
and role in organization

family relationship

Expansion for Right Only

Contagion for Left and R ight ±

sex (more female, place of

none

birth (region and size of
co mmunity), place of residence
(size of com munity)

Contagion for Left Only

Contagion for Right Only

sex, place of birth (region
and size of co mmunity)

occupation

The existence of substantively significant differences is the basis for the
classification displayed in Table 6. If such differences were found between
the characteristics of early and late terrorists, then these characteristics were
noted as having spread by expansion. Some of the differences were common
to both neo-Fascists and leftists, others were specific to one or the other.
They were classified accordingly. If, on the other hand, no meaningful differences were found between the characteristics·of neo-Fascist and leftist
terrorists active in the two periods, the diffusion was conceived to be the
product of a contagion effect, with the early terrorists infecting the late.
The classification reflects this concept as well.
There were several characteristics of the terrorist population which
spread through expansion between the two periods and were common to
rightists and leftists alike. Over time the terrorists tended to become
younger, less politically .experienced and more marginaliy committed to the
groups with which they were affiliated . They were also more likely to be
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residents of Rome the longer the episode continued. All the other
characteristics classified as either expansion or contagion related were ones
distinct to the neo-Fascists or the leftist revolutionaries. And since those differences were discussed earlier, we will not repeat them here.
The findings lead us to conclude that terrorism in Italy spread as the
result of both expansion and contagion. In the absence of interviews with a
sample of individuals included in the terrorist population, we cannot specify
precisely how these components worked in the process of terrorist recruitment. We can, of course, engage in speculation.
One thought that comes to mind is that Italy went through a new crisis
in 1976-77, one separable from that of 1968-69. While the latter was of an
institutional or generational nature, the former involved problems that had
to do with high rates of unemployment and inflation. And as in the first
crisis so too in the second, there was a substantial amount of mass street
agitation accompanied by accusations of governmental and party political
ineptitude. It is conceivable that younger and less politically involved
segments of the population largely unaffected by the first crisis were engaged by the second. Aware of terrorism as part of the repertoire of techniques available for the expression of political grievances, an awareness derived from the 1969-76 period, they became susceptable to its use.
We might also speculate that terrorism spread by contagion was the
result of exposure to the same social and institutional stimuli, the same living and working environments from which the early terrorists had already
been recruited. The FIAT Mirafiori automobile plant in Turin and the
universities of Padua and Rome are obvious examples. Concomitantly, it
may be the result of exposure to the same sorts of life experiences as already
gave rise to terrorist involvements that heighten the susceptibility. This element is probably not missing in the spread of terrorism by expansion either.
Yet in this context our suspicion is that the role of the mass media in making
people aware of and attracting them to terrorist activities is likely to play a
greater role in its cultivation.
Finally, it would be interesting to know if the characteristics we have
detected concerning Italy's protracted terrorist experience were unique to
that country, or if similar findings might result from investigations conducted elsewhere.
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